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This paper advocates for a progressive rethinking
of the day-ahead/intra-day power system security
management practice in the low-carbon energy
transition era. As a starting point, the need for
multi-TSO coordination in order to efficiently exploit
the value of grid flexibility towards operating the
low-carbon, multi-area power system securely and
economically is established. On this basis, the core
proposal of this paper is the adoption of a new
approach to day-ahead/intra-day multi-area power
system security management, inspired from the
principles of cooperative game theory. The proposed
approach relies on counterfactual analysis to evaluate
the (positive and/or negative) impact of each
distinctive control-area to the common security of
the multi-area system, thus providing clear economic
incentives to achieve the required coordination. This
proposal is not a marginal approach and notably
facilitates the integration of more detailed physical
modeling (including the non-convexities of the power
system) in the inter-TSO settlement of the multi-area
interconnected system security management cost. The
proposed framework allows some level of subsidiarity
and the definition of hedging products to cover ex-
post costs. Further from the blueprint of the proposed
approach, the paper discusses prominent research and
development pathways in order to progressively put
such vision into practice.
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As the clean energy transition advances, the wider integration of national and regional
electricity markets along with the growth of renewable and distributed generation resources are
jointly challenging multi-area power systems operation. Larger and larger energy volumes are
financially exchanged across the “electrical borders” of multi-area interconnected systems whilst
physical power flow patterns are becoming more and more random. Both these effects increase
generation redispatch costs and lead to operating the system closer to its security limits [1].
Widening the integration of security management practices by the enhanced coordination
of regional Transmission System Operators (TSOs) is an obvious countermeasure to the modern
multi-area power system challenges. The technical and economic benefits of such enhanced TSO
coordination are by now well documented [2,3]. Rather than beneficial, enhanced coordination
becomes necessary for the operation and further development of a multi-area power system
with grid flexibility resources (i.e., topological reconfiguration, dynamic transmission ratings,
phase-shifting transformers, etc.). From an operational standpoint, the activation of “local” grid
flexibility actions by the respective TSO within its control area may “globally” re-route power
flows and transfer congestion to a different control area [4]. Therefore, operational efficiency can
only be maximized when grid flexibility resources are employed in a mutually acceptable manner.
Similarly, from a long-term standpoint, relying only on the “local” impact of grid flexibility to
stimulate further development would naturally result in developing grid flexibility resources at
sub-optimal grid locations.
To date, the incentive structure for achieving the required level of coordination in a multi-area
system with grid flexibility is unclear. On the one hand, the physical properties of grid flexibility
are beyond the simplified (convex) nodal grid representation adopted in the electricity market.
Integrating such resource in forward (i.e., long-term, day-ahead and intra-day) markets may
only happen after an excessive rethinking of the market clearing assumptions and algorithms,
as well as of the respective settlement schemes. Therefore, there is presently no market-based
valuation for grid flexibility. On the other hand, present inter-TSO compensation schemes used
to share cross-border congestion management costs (see, for instance [5–10]) are also unsuitable.
First, these methods have been proven highly sensitive to power-flow controlling measures [11].
Further, they only account for (negative) costs, associated to the transit power flows through one’s
part of the multi-area system. Doing so, the methods fail to account for the (non-negative) value
of TSO grid flexibility, which is an intra-area resource that can be used to securely accommodate
power flows throughout the interconnected network [12].
In the present paper we revisit the framework for multi-area power system operation with
grid flexibility. We focus on the point after the execution of forward cross-border markets for
energy and argue for the coordinated mobilization of all redispatch and grid flexibility resources
by the multi-area system TSOs. To provide the necessary incentives for cooperation, the core
proposal of this paper is a methodology to share the costs and benefits of coordinated security
management between cooperating TSOs of a multi-area system. The methodology relies on
counterfactual analysis to quantify the contribution brought in by any single TSO to securing
the interconnected system. More specifically, we propose a set of what-if analyses to compute the
change in the system security management cost (i) without the fixed physical limitations (i.e.,
transmission capacities, reactances, security criteria, etc.) of each distinctive control area, and,
(ii) without the grid flexibility of each distinctive control area. Using the former as an indicator
of economic loss and the latter as an indicator of economic benefit, we introduce a settlement
scheme to share the total cost of security management while rewarding control areas with grid
flexibility of value to the system. Notice that the approach relying on what-if analysis is not a
marginal approach and therefore facilitates the integration of more detailed physical modeling
in the settlement scheme. Indeed the non-convexities of the power system pose no conceptual
challenge here (albeit, these remain of course a technical challenge for optimal decision making).












inter-TSO level and is compatible with any mechanism for the further allocation of such costs to
the system users at the intra-TSO (regional) area level.
2. Coordination framework for multi-area power system operation
This section provides a high-level description of the proposed approach for exploiting grid
flexibility in a multi-area power system. We focus on the operational timeframes and discuss the
three typical phases of deregulated power system operation, namely: (a) ex-ante market execution,
(b) secure physical delivery and (c) ex-post financial settlement.
(a) Ex-ante market execution
Ever since deregulation, the execution of forward markets for electrical energy has been
based on the stylized “bus-branch” modeling of the high-voltage transmission grid and the
linear “DC power flow” approximation of the respective physics. At the expense of (tolerable)
inaccuracies, these features combined produce market-clearing optimization problems with
desirable mathematical properties, ensuring the availability of robust solution algorithms and of
unique (or at least, indisputable) optimal solutions. Unfortunately, such simplifying assumptions
restrict the potential to explicitly represent grid flexibility during the ex-ante electricity market
execution phase. Indicatively, explicit modeling of topological reconfiguration would require
replacing the “bus-branch” model by the more detailed and more complex “node-breaker”
model, featuring a set of binary decision variables per bus of the original “bus-branch” grid. Such
a transition would obviously have numerous implications on the market actors’ exposure to risk,
the definition of essential concepts such as the short-term locational marginal prices, the long-
term financial transmission rights etc., not to mention the implied explosion of computational
complexity.
Rather than supporting such a radical (perhaps, even unattainable) reorganization for
electricity trading, our viewpoint is that grid flexibility can and should be exploited by TSOs
to ensure that the market execution outcome is implemented as closely as possible through the
physical transmission system. To allow for this, it suffices that forward markets are organized at
a granularity of several locational hubs (analogously to the zonal aggregation in the European
electricity market). Further, the ability to restrict the net import/export balances of the locational
hubs with linear constraints is necessary, in order to communicate to the market actors a feasible
trading domain including reliability requirements (e.g., the N-1 criterion or something more
advanced) but also grid flexibilities of the transmission system, so as to avoid outcomes whose
physical implementation is unrealistic. Finally, both trading at a portfolio level and/or a physical
unit level are applicable options, provided that after the market execution the respective market
actor communicates its physical schedules at a unit level and localized at the respective buses of
the transmission grid. With reference to such physical schedules, all market actors should also
be invited to offer their potential re-dispatch flexibility and cost thereof, in order to allow the
coordinated use of all resources by the TSOs.
(b) Secure physical delivery
The security management phase is the most fitting context to exploit grid flexibility, given
the less restrictive physical modeling domain (including non-convexities, non-linearities, static
& dynamic behaviours to the extent necessary). The complications come from multi-area
interconnection and therefore the important feature in the proposed framework is the mutually
acceptable decision making between the several TSOs involved. We envision that the common
mission of a group of cooperating TSOs should be to minimize deviations from the declared
physical schedules of the market actors, while respecting the system-wide security criteria.
The system-wide security criteria should of course be defined in a harmonized manner by












feature in our framework is that each TSO should also bear the cost attributable to the
restrictions corresponding to its control area. Within any control area the respective TSO should
also unilaterally define and offer the available grid flexibility resources, and eventually be
compensated if these resources create value outside its control area. Pointing to the following
sections of the manuscript for the details of the respective cost/value calculation process, we
argue that respecting the system-wide security criteria and following an agreed upon settlement
process are conditions guaranteeing the cooperation of all TSOs towards implementing the
mutually acceptable solution. The process of identifying such a mutually acceptable security
management solution can either be administered by a central entity (in the role of multi-TSO
coordinator) and/or implemented in a decentralized manner. In principle, both options allow for
managing any privacy concerns in the exchange of information between the cooperating TSOs
and are algorithmically feasible [3].
(c) Ex-post financial settlement
The general scope of the ex-post settlement process is to fully reimburse both the energy consumed
by the system end-users and its secure delivery through the electricity network. We focus here
on the latter, and the precise question of sharing the security management costs of a multi-area
system at the inter-TSO level. Our proposal is based on the premise that each TSO may contribute
both in a positive and in negative way to the minimization of security management costs.
To explain the negative contribution, let us notice that multi-area power system security
management essentially amounts to spending money (activating control actions) in order to
comply with the multi-area power system physical security limitations. Further, the multi-
area power system physical security limitations are the features (e.g., transmission capacities,
resistances and reactances, import/export stability, etc.) of all control area sub-systems. Therefore,
any single TSO may create a negative value to the group due to its respective part of the system
physical limitations. To introduce the positive contribution, beyond the basic fact that electricity
flows through the TSO operated infrastructure, we underline the role of grid flexibility. The
ability to re-route power flows with grid flexibility resources can be used to achieve operational
cost savings and operational reliability [12–14]. Therefore, any single TSO relieving part of the
multi-area system security restrictions would create a positive value to the group.
On this basis, we argue for sharing the costs incurred to secure the physical execution of the
electricity market transactions in a way that reflects the net contribution of each TSO in the multi-
area power system. To do so, we propose to evaluate the contributions of each single TSO to the
multi-area system security management by means of counterfactual analysis, as per the detailed
methodology developed in section 3. Further, to allocate payments and revenues as per such
valuations of contribution we propose the scheme detailed in section 4.
3. Evaluating TSO contributions to security management
This section presents the counterfactual analysis methodology proposed for evaluating the impact
of each TSO on the multi-area power system security management problem. We formalize here
the general principles of the methodology while abstracting away from the precise mathematical
properties of the models adopted for its implementation as well as the precise criteria expressing
the desirable system security level. A demonstrative implementation in the context of static N-1
security management is presented in section 5.
(a) Preliminaries & notation
To fix notation let us begin by denoting the state of the multi-area interconnected power system
pxq. We considered that it is formed in consequence of (i) the forward market positions (m),
and, (ii) the activation of redispatch actions prq, and, (iii) the activation of grid flexibility actions












function x f pm, r,gq encapsulating all aspects within the scope of the security management
problem.
We model the multi-area power system as a set of interconnected control areas a PA
r1, . . . , As, corresponding to respective decision making agents (TSOs) responsible for security
management. With this convention, the system-wide grid flexibility variable is a concatenation of
area-specific control variable vectors, as in g rg1 . . . gAs.
To model the mission of cooperative security management, we first define for each control
area its set of secure states X a, expressing the admissible values for the multi-area system state
variable x as per the intra-area security restrictions (e.g., N-1 line overload constraints, voltage
limits, system stability limits). Then, the security domain of the multi-area power system is the
intersection of all area-wise sets of secure states1. In other words, managing the security of the
multi-area power system amounts to choosing control actions so as to ensure that,




The grid flexibility action space for the whole multi-area system is the Cartesian product
of the area-wise action sets, as in g P
A
a1
Ga. For redispatching variables, we explicitly denote
the dependence on the respective forward market positions pmq and symbolize the respective
(system-wide) action space as R pmq. Finally, taking the cooperative approach to security
management concerns finding control actions across all system areas that are mutually acceptable
by all TSOs. In compact notation, it suffices to express mutual acceptability in terms of (i)
respecting all area-wise security limitations, and, (ii) a system-wide cost function to be minimized.
Denoting the latter as CApx, r,mq measuring the cost of redispatch deviations from the market
participants forward positions, we pose the cooperative security management problem over the



















Let us at this point re-introduce that the impact of any control area on the security management
of the multi-area system can be considered as twofold. On the one hand, by way of its fixed
physical properties in the system-wide physical model fpm, r,gq and acceptable states in (3.1),
any individual area may restrict the set of feasible solutions to (3.2). At the same time, by way of
its grid flexibility decision variables in the left-hand-side of (3.1), any individual area may enlarge
the set of feasible solutions to (3.2). The former impact can be understood as an economic loss
pLaq since reducing the feasible solution space may only lead to decisions of increased (at least,
equal) economic cost in a minimization problem. Similarly, the latter can be understood as an
economic benefit pBaq since increasing the feasible solution space at negligible economic cost.
In order to compute these two quantities we apply counterfactual reasoning. More specifically,
to quantify the economic loss per area we compare the cost of the full security management
problem (3.2) to the cost of a problem relaxation (i.e., larger set of feasible solutions) developed












while doing away with the physical limitations of the area in question. In a similar manner, we
quantify economic benefit by comparing the cost of the full security management problem (3.2)
to the cost of a problem restriction (i.e., smaller set of feasible solutions) developed while doing
away with the grid flexibility of the area in question. Accordingly, we compute the net impact of
every area to security management as:
Na La  Ba @a PA. (3.3)
(i) Economic loss contribution
To compute the economic loss contributed by any single area, one needs to quantify the additional
costs incurred by the multi-area cooperating TSO group due to the area physical and security
limitations. In other words, the economic loss contributed by any single area is defined as the
difference between the optimal objective of (3.2) and the system-wide cost resulting from the
decisions all other TSOs would take if the transmission network of the area in question posed no
restriction whatsoever.
To find such what-if decisions, we model a fictitious situation wherein the detailed
transmission network model of the area in question is replaced by a fully controllable link to
the area generation, loads and redispatch resources. To model an area as a fully controllable link
(i) all generators and load are connected to a single super-node, and, (ii) the super-node is only
linked with the buses connecting the original network to external areas through transmission
paths of adjustable impedance. For demonstration, Fig. 1 exemplifies the reduction of a single
area (transmission area A of the multi-area system shown in the upper part) into its ideal
simplification. In the lower part of Fig. 1, all transmission links shown in black are to be modelled














Figure 1. Ideal reduction of transmission area A
In the compact notation, we will employ symbol u{a to denote the variable impedances




to denote the multi-area
system physical model, when area paq is represented by its controllable simplification. Further, we






. We compute such decisions














































constraints from area paq have been omitted in (3.4). Given the decisions corresponding to the full



















¤ 0, @a r1, . . . , As. (3.5)
(ii) Economic benefit contribution
To compute the economic benefit contributed by any single area, one needs to quantify the cost
reduction gained by the multi-area cooperating TSO group thanks to using the area grid flexibility
resources in a mutually acceptable manner. In other words, the economic benefit contributed
by any single area is defined as the difference between the optimal objective of (3.2) and the
system-wide cost computed with the baseline decisions the TSO would take if it was using its
grid flexibility resources independently.
To find such what-if decisions, we model a fictitious situation wherein the TSO would be
deciding autonomously and without any consideration for the physical properties and security
domains of all external areas in the interconnected system. We do so for any single area with grid
flexibility by solving a modified security management problem wherein the area of interest is
the only intra-area network modeled in full detail and all other intra-area networks are reduced
again to (ideal) controllable links. As an example, Fig. 2. illustrates the reduction of the multi-area




















In the compact notation, we will employ symbol ḡa to denote the baseline intra-area grid
flexibility decisions that would be taken independently by control area paq as well as function
f̃ a pm, r,g, u aq for the multi-area system physical model, when area paq is the only area
not represented by its controllable simplification (i.e., the only area modeled in full detail).
Accordingly, we find the baseline grid flexibility decisions per area by stating and solving the
relaxation of (3.2) as,








Notice that apart from using the reduced physical model f̃ a pm, r,g, u aq only the security
constraints for area paq are considered in (3.6). It is necessary to acknowledge here that (3.6)
provides baseline decisions while following an optimistic modeling convention. Particularly, it
models the behavior of a single TSO enjoying full control (or rather, perfect collaboration) of all
control-areas in its external grid. This convention is used here due to its simplicity/tractability
advantage, as a first approach towards finding baseline decisions for modeling grid flexibility
only in the cost allocation mechanism. It is of course of interest to explore alternative conventions,
for instance the behavior of a TSO taking baseline decisions that would “protect” its intra-
area grid even from the adversary behavior of the TSOs responsible for its external grid. Our
overarching framework imposes no restriction on the assumption used to set the baseline
decisions for modeling grid flexibility.
Moving on, we state the restriction to (3.2) when the grid flexibility decisions for any area a are



























Problem (3.7) is a restriction of (3.2) with the additional constraint imposing that while solving the
multi-area problem, the grid flexibility controls within area paq must remain fixed to the baseline
what-if decisions2. Given the solutions corresponding to the full and restricted multi-area security






in (3.7) respectively, the economic benefit








¥ 0, @a r1, . . . , As. (3.8)












4. Inter-TSO settlement principle
Areas with a positive net contribution to security management would be areas that, by way
of their intra-area transmission capacity and grid flexibility, bring a value to the multi-area
interconnected system over and above the costs of maintaining them secure. These areas are
effectively resources enabling the economic and secure operation of the multi-area system. On
this basis, we propose an inter-TSO compensation mechanism that shares the total redispatching
costs while also remunerating TSOs with positive net contribution.
In the proposed scheme, areas with positive net contribution are rewarded with an amount of
money equal to their net contribution. Areas with negative net contribution share the augmented
security management cost (i.e., total redispatching costs plus remuneration towards positive
contributing areas) pro-rata of the absolute net contribution. The inter-TSO settlement scheme
is summarized in the following three steps, defining:





(ii) non-zero participation factors for areas with negative contributions as,
na 
|mintNa, 0u|°A
j1 |mintNj , 0u|
¥ 0, (4.2)
(iii) revenues per area as,









A positive value of (4.3) corresponds to a revenue while a negative value corresponds to a
payment. Further, only for areas with positive net contribution, the first term of (4.3) will be
greater than zero while the second term, as per (4.2), equal to zero. Conversely, only for areas
with negative net contribution, the first term of (4.3) will be equal to zero while the second term
will be negative. Finally, we should underline that areas with grid flexibility and a negative net
contribution would still be rewarded in the proposed scheme, by bearing a smaller share of the
security management costs.
5. Demonstrative implementation
This section exemplifies the steps of our proposal and discusses its results through a
demonstrative implementation. To facilitate result interpretability we consider a simple test-
system inspired from the academic literature and focus on the well known application of
N-1 steady-state security management. We retain a detailed analysis of the proposed scheme
properties on alternative security management contexts and based on realistic multi-area systems
as topics for future work.
(a) Test-case setup
We setup a three-area interconnected test-system with the one-line diagram shown in the top part
of Figure 1. The starting point of each distinct area is the well known 5 PJM single-area case [15].
For the demonstrative purposes of our study, we have adopted the following modifications:
(i) three identical interconnector branches of impedance 0.003   j0.028pu and permanent
thermal rating 1.5pu are introduced to connect bus pairs [(A1,B5),(A3,C5)],(B2,C4)];
(ii) bus splitting/merging breakers are introduced at buses B2, B3 and B4 of transmission













(iii) the branch linking buses (A1,A2) in transmission area A and the branch linking buses
(C4,C5) are replaced with Phase-shifting Transformers (PSTs) of equal impedance and
thermal rating. The phase angle shift range of both transformers is 100;
(iv) the marginal generation cost of each unit in transmission area A is increased by $200pu
while the marginal generation cost of each unit at area C is reduced by $200pu.
While modeling forward energy markets is beyond the scope of the demonstrative test-case,
we adopt the following conventions without any loss of generality. First, we establish a market-
based reference schedule for all generating units while considering every distinct area of the
multi-area system as a distinct trading hub. More specifically, we solve a standard DC-OPF
minimizing generation costs and while modeling the power flows, transmission capacity ratings
and voltage angle difference limits for the three cross-area interconnection branches linking the
three trading hubs3. Further, we assume that all generating units are online and that the respective
market participants offer (i) the available head-room (i.e., capacity - market dispatch) of each unit
as upward redispatch resource, at the marginal generation cost of the unit, and (ii) the available
floor-room (respectively, market dispatch - minimum stable generation) of each unit as downward
redispatch resource for free.
(b) Security management application
We consider the steady-state N-1 security management decision making context by solving a
standard DC-SCOPF problem.
The objective function of the problem seeks to minimize the cost of activating redispatch
offers and the contingency set includes 20 events corresponding to the outage of any single
branch or phase-shifting transformer, including the cross-area interconnectors. In preventive
mode, the set of candidate decisions includes the redispatching of generating units, the
position of bus splitting/merging breakers as well as the activation threshold for phase-shifting
transformers. In corrective post-contingency mode, we model the (manual) modification of the
bus splitting/merging breaker positions as well as the (automated) behavior of phase-shifting
transformers, according to the respective activation threshold and rule-based operating modes
[16]. For both problem stages, we impose network connectivity constraints on top of power
balance constraints, active power flow constraints, and voltage angle difference constraints.
For reference, the total redispatch cost to achieve N-1 steady-state security taking advantage
of grid flexibility is equal to $25038 and omitting the grid flexibility resources would cause
an additional cost of  18.6%. Figure 3 plots the net import/export positions of the three
trading hubs as per the forward market outcome (leftmost), the N-1 secure dispatch using grid
flexibility and the N-1 secure dispatch omitting grid flexibility (rightmost). It is evident that grid
flexibility has a value in reducing the deviations between forward financial transactions and
secure physical delivery of energy. Finally, table 1 presents an overview of the network congestion
(i.e., active transmission constraints in the DC-SCOPF solution) with and without grid flexibility.
For convenience, the entries corresponding to the system interconnection branches are shown in
bold. One may notice that with grid flexibility the network would be congested in more (different)
post-contingency states. This shows that the pre-contingency dispatch of the generating units is
of more cost-efficient and making the most of the available transmission capacity under several
different contingency network configurations. More importantly, notice the difference in the
occurrence of congestion on the system interconnection capacity. Without grid flexibility intra-
area congestion is more prominent, suggesting that the system interconnection capacity remains
underutilized.
3In a real-life implementation, all TSOs may well also express their intra-area security domains to the market by means of
proxy constraints which would encapsulate a part of the grid physical complexity. For instance, the flow-based approach in












Figure 3. Net export positions per system area
No Flexibility Grid Flexibility
Contingency Congestion Contingency Congestion
A1 – A4 A4 – A5 A1 – A5 A4 – A5
A1 – A5 A4 – A5 C1 – C4 C4 – C5
B1 – B4 B4 – B5 C1 – C2 C4 – C5
B1 – B5 A4 – B5 C1 – C5 C4 – C5; A3 – C5
A1 – A5 A3 – C5 B1 – B5 A1 – B5
A3 – C5 A1 – B5
Table 1. Network congestion overview
(c) Counterfactual analysis of area-wise impacts
We begin with the results of the counterfactual analysis of the impact of the physical
characteristics, security constraints and grid flexibility of all areas to the multi-area security
management task.
Figure 4.a. plots the economic loss indicators for the three areas of the test-system. We recall
here that these indicators measure the relative costs implied by the physical characteristics (e.g.,
impedances, capacity ratings, topology, etc.) and security constraints of any single area. We notice
first that area C has the smallest absolute value of economic loss. This is the area exporting the
most, Figure 3, thanks to the available cheapest generation resources. The interpretation of the
smallest economic loss indicator (i.e., smallest difference in cost when neglecting the physical
characteristics & security limitations of this area) relates to this fact. There is still a large security
management cost to pay in order to get the cheap power coming out of area C to the loads located
in areas A,B of the interconnected system. It is the cost of keeping areas A,B as well as the system
interconnection capacity N-1 secure. Conversely, importing area A has the largest absolute value
of economic loss. This loss is associated to the security of the intra-area transmission network
between the loads in area A and the exporting areas B, C. Without this intra-area network, it
would be much cheaper to securely serve the area A loads.
Figure 4.b. plots the economic benefit indicators for the three areas of the test-system. We recall
here that these indicators measure the value of the grid flexibility inside each area to the multi-
area system. We start again from area C to discuss the zero value attached to the PST inside this
area. In our detailed results, we have noted that the settings of this PST that would be chosen
independently by the area C TSO (assuming the ideal simplification of the rest of the network)
match the settings of the PST from the solution of the full multi-area N-1 SCOPF. In other words












Figure 4. Economic impact indicators
Area A Area B Area C
-12463.78 -5517.98 -3935
Table 2. Net impact indicators per area ($)
meaning that the “global” value of this PST to the multi-area system is zero. The PST in area A has
a small positive global value to the system. Neglecting the rest of the network, the TSO in area A
would have set the activation threshold for this device to keep the flow at 21.1% of the respective
rating. However, considering the security management of the full multi-area system the optimal
setting is at 13.1%. The computed economic benefit value of $14.09 expresses the avoided cost
thanks to this modified setting. Most notably, there is a large economic benefit value attached to
the grid flexibility inside area B. We recall that it is possible to split 3 out of 5 buses inside this area.
In our detailed results, we have noted that in the full multi-area N-1 SCOPF the bus breakers are
in different position with respect to the optimal positions from the area B individual perspective
both for the base case configuration (no outage) as well as in all credible contingency states.
(d) Security cost settlement
Table 2 presents the indicators quantifying the net impact of each area on security management.
For the considered test-case all indicator values are negative, meaning that the economic loss
associated to securing any area of the network is always larger than the economic benefit of
the area flexibility. As a result, all three area TSOs should pay to share the $25038 cost of
the redispatching actions necessary to secure the multi-area system. The resulting allocation
coefficients from (4.1 – 4.3) are pro-rata of the negative impact indicator values. Figure 5 presents
the cost allocation coefficients. We notice the large share of the cost to be paid by (importing)
area A, which was found to have the largest negative impact to the multi-area system security
management cost.
To put these results in perspective, we have also repeated the whole computation for the case
where there is no flexibility in the grid. We found that without grid flexibility area B would be
allocated 36.2% of the increased multi-area security management cost. Further than the reduction
of its cost share, this area of course benefits from the system security management cost reduction
induced by grid flexibility, as demonstrated by the comparison in Figure 6. This result exemplifies
how the proposed method provides a clear incentive to develop grid flexibility at locations












Figure 5. Security management cost allocation coefficients
the increase in the cost allocation coefficient in the case with flexibility outweighs the overall
reduction in the total cost to be shared among the three system areas.
Figure 6. Security management costs ($)
6. Conclusions
This paper revisits the framework for the coordinated operation of a multi-area interconnected
power system, with a view on making the most of the grid flexibility furnished by power
flow controlling measures embedded in the transmission infrastructure. While the electricity
market is a key instrument for coordination in modern power systems, grid flexibility remains
unrepresented. The physical and mathematical modeling properties of this resource are well
beyond the underlying assumptions of the electricity market rules and the scope of applicability
of market clearing algorithms. On this premise, we argue for the coordinated deployment of grid
flexibility in the post-market clearing stage of security management by cooperating TSOs of a
multi-area system.
While the reasoning for the coordinated deployment of grid flexibility can be considered as
evident, clear incentives to all involved stakeholders are necessary to put cooperation in practice.
To this end, we introduced a new way for sharing the costs of multi-area security management
at the inter-TSO level. The aim of our proposal is to share these costs in a way that reflects the
contribution of every control area to the problem of keeping the multi-area system secure. More












globally helps alleviating congestion and/or penalizing control areas whose intra-area network
parameters globally result in intensifying congestion. These rewards and penalties are meant
as financial incentives promoting the coordinated, cost-efficient operation of a multi-area power
system with grid flexibility.
To compute the cost-sharing rewards and penalties we developed an approach inspired
by cooperative game theory. The key idea is to compare the cost of securing the multi-area
interconnected system to hypothetical situations wherein (i) the intra-area grid flexibility of any
single control area is not available for coordinated use and (ii) the intra-area network of any single
control area poses no physical and/or security restrictions. The former what-if study can quantify
the economic benefit value of the grid flexibility provided by each control area while the latter can
quantify the economic loss originating from the design features of each control area. Accordingly,
summing these two values quantifies the net impact of any control area on the system security
cost. An important feature of this settlement scheme is that it imposes no additional limitation in
modeling the physics of the power system. Indeed, the same process used to identify mutually
acceptable decisions to secure the multi-area system is also integrated in the counterfactual what-
if analysis for the impact of any single control area. Moreover, we underline that the proposed
settlement process stays at the inter-TSO level. Each TSO could follow a local regulatory scheme
to allocate this ex-post cost to the grid users. We could further also envision that energy market
operators could propose hedging products related to these ex-post costs.
To exemplify our proposal, we relied on a demonstrative application to the problem of static N-
1 security management for a fictitious three-area interconnected system. We designed such system
with varying degrees of intra-area grid flexibility, as well as intra-area generation resources of
different cost magnitude, for the sake of demonstrating the functionality of the settlement scheme.
The results clearly showcase how the proposed scheme would reward intra-area grid flexibility,
provided that it creates a global benefit for other external areas of an interconnected system. In
other words, it would promote using intra-area grid flexibility in a cooperative manner. At the
same time, the case study also exemplifies that the proposed settlement scheme would allocate a
larger share of the multi-area system security management cost to a single individual area relying
on imports of electricity through the rest of the transmission infrastructure (i.e., a heavy user of
the transmission infrastructure).
This paper served to (re-)open the discussion on evaluating grid flexibility by means of inter-
TSO compensation. We believe that the topic is rather timely, given the widening integration
of local electricity markets and the increasing uncertainties facing power system operation.
On the basis of the work reported here, the following steps of this research will pursue
the further development of our proposal. Going beyond the demonstrative application, we
intend to study the computational efficiency of counterfactual analysis with respect to real-
life interconnected power system security management applications. At the same time, going
beyond the formalization of the main principles, we intend to analyze in detail the implications
of potentially adopting the proposed settlement scheme at the inter-TSO level. Combining these
parallel efforts will progressively allow to establish the utility of our proposal for promoting the
cooperation necessary to efficiently operate modern multi-area power systems.
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